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TECHNOLOGY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND
RELATIVE WAGES IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY
ABSTRACT
Arguably the most important development in recent decades in US factor markets is the
decline in the relative wage of the unskilled. By contrast, in Europe it is undoubtedly the rise
and persistence of unemployment. Technology has been identified as a key reason for the rising
US wage inequality, while labor market rigidities are often cited as a key reason for European
unemployment. This paper seeks to provide a unified account of these major factor market
developments. It models the impact of technical change on relative wages and unemployment
in a world in which one country has flexible and the other rigid labor market institutions. The
results depart significantly but sensibly from what one would expect in a fully flexible wage







1.1 A Global Approach
Over the past twenty years factor market developments in the United States and much of
Europe have contrasted sharply.1 Arguably the most important development in the United States
is the sharp decline in the relative wage of the unskilled. By contrast, in Europe the most
important development is undoubtedly the rise and persistence of unemployment. A growing body
of research traces the growing wage inequality in the United States to technical change. One
interpretation of the rising unemployment in Europe focuses on labor market rigidities.
There is an important respect in which these accounts are unsatis~ing. The United States
and Europe are part of a single global economy, and they share a common technological regime.
Yet research has focused on the cases one at a rime. This suggests that an important check of the
robustness of these accounts is to examine them in a unified model of a trading world, It must
provide a general equilibrium determination of wages and unemployment, while allowing for
cross-country differences in the structure of labor market institutions. The model of Davis (1996)
provides just such a framework. The present paper considers the implications of technical change
for the evolution of wages and unemployment in a global trading equilibrium.
This study has a single central message. Allowing for even one of the countries in a
trading world to have rigid labor market institutions fundamentally alters the link between
technical change and factor returns~or the whole world. At times the results will be exactly
contrary to those derived in a fully flexible wage setting. Nonetheless our flexible wage results
1See e.g. Freeman and Katz ( 995) and CEPR (1995).
1continue to provide insight. They are here key to understanding movements in employment in the
economy with real rigidities.z
From a wide array of comparative statics considered, the paper identifies just a few that
seem to be of real interest. These hold promise of providing a unified account of the major factor
market developments of recent decades in both the United States and Europe.
1.2 Back~ound
The role of technical change in giving rise to observed movements in skilled to unskilled
wages has been a source of great interest and controversy, Some researchers, as Berman, Bound,
and Griliches (1994), have identified technical change as the central cause for the decline of
unskilled relative wages in the United States. This viewpoint has been supported by the work of
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), and Berman, Machin and Bound (1996), among others. A
contra~ view has been advanced by Learner (1994), with a more mixed picture emerging in
Learner (1995).
This discussion has focused on the role of labor-saving technical change, with the
computer revolution particularly in mind. However there has been some dispute about the
relevance of factor versus sector bias in technical change, as in Learner (1995) and Krugman
(1995). Learner focused on a case in which the United States is a small country, and in which
technical change is local. Krugman focused on a case in which the United States is a large country
2The departures from conventional flexible wage results here underscore the importance
of considering all three elements of the Freeman, Katz (1995) Supply-Demand-Institutions
paradigm within a unified general equilibrium fi-amework.
2and the technical change is global. In the former, the sector bias of technical change is key,
whereas in the latter conditions are specified under which only the factor bias matters for the
qualitative effects on relative wages. Freeman and Katz (1995) concur with Krugman that many
of the major tectilcal innovations should be looked on as global rather than local shocks. Thus if
one also wants to account for the different experience of Europe and America regarding wages,
one cannot look only at technology. If technical progress is to be part of the explanation, then it
must be via the form in which local labor institutions mediate the shocks.
There are a few stylized facts that will prove usefil in considering the theory [see Freeman
and Katz (1995)]. (1A) The relative position of unskilled in the United States has deteriorated
more sharply in the US than in Europe. (lB) A stronger version of this would state that the
relative wage of the unskilled declined in the United States while it was unchanged in Europe.
(2) Unemployment in Europe rises. (3A) Some work, as in Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), has
suggested that this occurred at unchanged relative goods prices. (3B) Other work, such as
Krueger (1995) and Sachs and Shatz (1995) has argued that the relative price of unskilled
intensive goods has fallen. (4) Measured skill intensities of production have been rising, even
where the relative wage of skill has risen. We will take this in a weak form, excluding cases in
which skill intensity falls in all sectors.
The paper has three additional sections, Section 2 outlines the global trading model.
Section 3 develops some basic concepts regarding the links between technical change and factor
returns. It then derives the implications of technical change for relative wages and unemployment
when one country features a rigid minimum wage. Section 4 concludes.
32 A Simple Model of Trade and Unemployment
In this section we develop a simple model on which to found our analysis of the effects of
technical change on trade, wages and unemployment, The basic structure of the economy will be
that of the canonical Heckscher-Ohlin model. This is amended to allow for a rigid real wage for
the unskilled, in the spirit of Brecher (1974).3 The general equilibrium links between endowments,
goods prices and factor prices, and the link to the level of unemployment are illustrated in a
diagram from Davis (1996). Conditions are noted which allow even economies with sharply
divergent factor market institutions to feature factor price equalization,4 Since many of the ‘
comparative statics that we later consider will lead factor price equalization to break down, we
also develop an import demand, export supply framework for determining equilibrium. This
emphasizes that in the presence of factor -- hence goods -- price rigidities, equilibrium in markets
is attained by movements in the level of employment.
3In choosing this approach, we abstract from the important issue of the source of wage
rigidity. This is justified by the transparency that it allows in examining the already complex links
between technology, trade, factor prices and unemployment. One more explicit approach is to
treat the minimum wage as the result of a simple game between governments, as in Davis (1996).
This remains a direction for additional research,
4Using a model which features factor price equalization as a benchmark is justified by the
great simplicity it yields to the analysis. However, as Learner (1994) has emphasized, the FPE
result implies that conditional on goods prices, technology, and diversified production, factor
prices are independent of local factor supplies. The work of Freeman and Katz (1995), as well as
that of Robbins (1996), suggests that local relative factor supplies do matter for relative wages,
This suggests the value of pursuing extensions to the present study in directions in which local
factor supplies do matter.
4Consider the integrated world economy.s The structure of this economy is the simple
Heckscher-Ohlin model, except that employment of unskilled labor will be subject to a binding
minimum wage. There are two goods, X and Y.Let P be the relative price of X in terms of Y,We
assume that preferences of all consumers are identical and homothetic. Thus the ratio of Xto Y
consumed depends only on relative goods prices. Technologies are constant returns to scale. We
assume that at all factor price ratios, and for all comparative statics on technology, X is the
relatively skill intensive good. Both goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
The goods are produced with skilled and unskilled labor, available in fixed supply given by
Hand L. Since the skilled wage is assumed flexible, skilled labor will always be filly employed.
Market clearing requires:
Hx+Hr=H
With a minimum wage for unskilled labor above the market clearing level, unskilled labor will not
be filly employed. Letting N be world unskilled employment, U be the number of unemployed,
and L the number of unskilled, the factor market constraint is that:
Nx+Nr+U=N+U=L
The contrast between the flexible and rigid real wage worlds is summarized in a simple
diagram from Davis (1996), appearing as Figure 1. Two relations sufice to describe the essentials
of the global economy. The first can be thought of as a “Heckscher-Ohlin” mapping between the
relative world endowment, h q H/L, and the equilibrium relative goods price, P. This appears in
5Dixit and Norman (1980) turn the parableofSamuelson(1949) into a powefil analytic
device. They establish conditions under which a fill employment world with trade but no factor
mobility replicates the “integrated equilibrium” of an economy with perfect goods and factor
mobility. Davis (1996) extends this to the case in which one country has unemployment (due to
rigid real wages) while the other does not.
5quadrant one, and has the sensible result that a world relatively more abundant in skill will have a
lower relative price of the skill intensive good. The second relation can be thought of as a
“Stolper-Samuelson” mapping between relative goods prices and factor prices. While this is
typically written as a relation with relative factor prices, it is more convenient to depict it as a
relation between the goods price, P, and the wage of the unskilled, w~. This appears in quadrant 2.
This has the sensible interpretation that the wage of the unskilled is directly tied to the relative
price of the good that employs the unskilled relatively intensively. Heuristically, one can think of
the path of determination in the flexible wage economy as moving from the exogenous world






Figure 1 Unemployment in General Equilibrium
However this path is not available when there is a rigid minimum wage for the unskilled at
a level w~* above the flexible wage, w~F.The Stolper-Samuelson relation continues to hold
6exactly, ‘Ifin equilibrium the unskilled wage is to be w~*, then this must be supported by an
equilibrium goods price of P*. But the Heckscher-Ohlin relation holds now not in terms of
endowments, but in terms of employed factors. If the equilibrium goods prices are to be P*, then
the employment composition must be at h* > h. Since all skilled labor is employed, due to its
flexible wage, equilibrium requires that unemployment among the unskilled rise to the point that
employed factors are in the ratio h*. Given the world endowment of skilled and unskilled labor,
this will determine a precise level of unemployment. This can be done for each level that the
minimum wage could be set at. This gives rise to what I have termed the “Brecher” relation, afier
Brecher (1974), which appears in quadrant four.
The conditions under which a world with distinct countries linked by goods trade
replicates this integrated world economy is detailed in Davis (1996). A key result is that in spite of
the institutional differences, and the fact that unemployment arises only in the country that
implements the minimum wage, free trade in commodities leads to complete factor price
equalization. The reason is that in spite of the institutional differences, trade equates goods prices,
hence all producers face the same zero profit conditions, which in turn yield equal factor prices.
Here we develop a two country version of this model that builds on these insights.G But
since we will consider comparative statics that introduce cross-country differences in
technologies, our framework must be robust to failures of factor price equalization. Consider a
world with two countries, which following Krugman (1995) we will call America and Europe.
The essential difference between America and Europe lies in their factor market institutions.
America is a flexible wage, fill employment economy. Europe has a rigid minimum wage for the
GWe assume here and throughout that both countries are always diversified in production.
7unskilled set at w~* in terns of the numeraire. The two countries have conventional market
clearing conditions for skilled labor. But these conditions look different for America and Europe
in the market for unskilled labor. For America:
LXA.+ L+. = L.4.
But in Europe, the condition instead appears as:
NxE+NrE+U=@+U=LE
A key insight to the international equilibrium is that with wages -- and so goods prices --
fixed, it is unemployment that adjusts to clear the market. Thus, we can depict the international
equilibrium in an import demand/export supply framework with European unemployment on the











Figure 2 The Trading Equilibrium
8Where the minimum wage w~* binds, goods prices must be P*. But since American import
demand depends only on the price P*, it is independent of the level of European unemployment.
The role that European unemployment plays is to make the unskilled good sufficiently scarce so
as to support the price P*. Thus at this price, Europe is obliged to meet whatever excess demand
or supply the rest of the world may present to it at P*. Given our assumptions on demand and
technology, European unemployment rises linearly with the world excess demand for X.
Equilibrium is determined at point T, with unemployment at the level T’.
The case depicted in Figure 2 is the benchmark case developed in Davis (1996), in which
America and Europe have identical endowments. In this case, trade with America doubles
European unemployment from its autarky rate, moving from A to T’. More generally, depending
on the position of the American import demand curve, trade could raise or lower European
unemployment.7
3 Technical Change: Global and Local
3.1 A Two-Sector Leontief Model
The effect of technical change on factor prices in the two sector general equilibrium model
has a variety of facets to consider.a These include whether the change is (geographically) local or
global, the sector bias, the factor bias, elasticities of goods supply and demand, and factor
7None of the results derived in this paper depend on the pattern of trade, or equivalently,
whether trade with America raises or lowers European unemployment,
8The classic analysis of technical change in the two-sector general equilibrium model with
flexible wages and fill employment is Findlay and Grubert (1959).
9substitution.9 For analytic purposes, it is convenient to begin with a model of Leontief
technologies. 10As well, throughout we restrict attention to three cases of factor bias -- neutral,
pure labor saving, and pure skill saving.
A simple setting for thinking about the links between technical change and factor returns is
that ofMussa(1979) [see Figure 3]. We consider the case of two goods produced under perfect
competition and constant returns to scale. This yields two conditions equating prices and unit
costs for the respective goods. The concavity of the cost finction assures that in factor price
space the upper contour sets are
respective zero profit conditions
(weakly) convex, In the case of Leontief technologies,
are linear.
the
P =cx(w~) w~) =w~am+ wLau 1 = CY(WH, wL) = w~a~ + w~a~~
When production is diversified, equilibrium factor prices are determined by the intersection of the
zero profit curves in factor price space.
9If technology was a pure public good, freely available to all, then the local vs. global
distinction would not be relevant -- all shocks would be global. And no doubt one of the
important shocks that we would want to think about -- the microcomputer revolution -- is in
important respects global. Nevertheless, carefil estimation has confirmed the existence and
importance of cross-country technical differences at the industry level, as well as variations in
these across time [see Jorgenson (1995)],
10We consider the effects of factor substitution in Section 3.4 below. The restriction to
Leontief technologies here was made for three reasons. First, making this restriction allows for a
greatly simplified analysis of a number of points that have remained opaque in previous
treatments. A similar restriction has been made in sections of Learner (1995) and Krugman
(1995). Second, the work of Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) showing steady rises in skill intensity
across all sectors even as relative skilled wages rose suggests that factor substitution is not the
dominant element of the story. Finally, we will demonstrate below that of the cases in which the
principal qualitative results depend on factor substitution, none satis~ the set of stylized facts that
we use as a screen,
10A few general results from the analysis of technical change in a flexible wage economy will
be useful in considering the effect on relative wages of our experiments. men good prices are
fixed, the qualitative impact on relative factor prices is entirely determined by the sector in which
the technical change occurs, independent of the factor bias. For example, technical progress in X
always leads to an outward movement of the zero profit curve. As is evident from Figure 3, the
relative skilled wage ahvays rises as a result. This point has been emphasized by Learner (1994).
Figure 3 Neutral Technical Progress in X
at Fixed Prices
When goods prices do adjust endogenously, this bifurcation by sector need not hold. The
reason is that changes in goods prices may mute or reverse the impact effect of technical change
on factor prices. The first step towards understanding this is to determine how the technical
change affects output supplies and demands at unchanged prices, hence to determine the direction
in which goods prices will change. One can then identi~ the cases in which price changes
reinforce the impact effect on the unskilled wage, as well as those in which it may mute or reverse
these effects. The induced price changes will only mute the impact effect when demands and
11supplies are sufficiently elastic -- what we will call the “elastic case. ” In the contraty “inelastic
case,” the price movement is sufficient to reverse the impact effect on the unskilled wage. The
possibility that induced price changes may reverse the impact effect of technical change on factor
prices figures prominently in the discussion of Krugman (1995).
Here Leontief technologies allow a simple conclusion.ll Neutral technical progress at fixed
goods prices always raises output of the progressing sector, while leaving output of the other
sector unchanged. The reason is that with Leontief technologies, neutral progress does not affect
the sectoral allocation of resources. Thus output rises only in the progressing sector. Since the
implied change in income will, with homothetic preferences, raise demand for both goods
proportionally, it follows that the relative price of the progressing sector’s good must fall. So
neutral technical change always leaves open the possibility that endogenous price changes will
reverse the impact effect on relative factor prices. 12
Pure labor saving technical progress, in either sector, always raises the output of the labor
intensive good at unchanged prices, while reducing output of the skill intensive good. We
illustrate this for the case of progress in the X sector in Figure 4, Consider the problem in two
steps. For the moment, we fix the resources allocated to Y(at B), and so leave Youtput
unchanged. Now note that a pure labor saving change in X means that the initial level of output in
X can be produced with the same level of employed skill and less labor (a move from A to A’). Of
11For a complete list of results with a flexible wage, see Appendix A,
12Krugman(1995) provides a convenient boundary case. When technology is Leontief,
tectilcal progress is global, both countries are diversified, and preferences are Cobb-Douglas,
then the induced price changes exactly offset the impact effect of technical progress on relative
wages.
12course, this labor will in equilibrium be employed. We can invoke the Rybczynsti theorem, which
here implies that the output of labor intensive Ywill rise while that of X declines at fixed prices.
Since with homothetic demand the incremental income has raised demand for both goods at the
initial prices, this implies an excess supply of the labor intensive good. Its relative price must fall,
which then works toward a rise in the relative skilled wage. Thus, in our example of labor saving
technical change in the X sector, the goods price movement reitiorces the rise in the relative
skilled wage,
Figure 4 Labor Saving Progress in X:
Output Effects
If instead the labor saving progress were in the labor intensive sector, then the price
movements instead would mute or reverse the impact effect of technical change. A parallel story
can be told for pure skill saving technical change. This depresses the price of the skill intensive
good, so reinforces the decline in the relative skilled wage if the progress is in the Ysector, but
mutes or reverses the impact effect of skill saving technical progress in the X sector.
133.2 Technical Change, Wages, and Unemployment
We now consider the effects of technical change for the case in which Europe imposes a
minimum wage.13 Our base case assumes that technologies in America and Europe are initially
identical. We first consider technical change that is global in scope, and then change that is
localized in Europe or America.
The effects of global technical change are quite similar to those described above. The ordy
amendment that we need to consider is that any implied changes in the unskilled wage must now
be met with changes in unemployment that return the unskilled wage to its initial level. We saw
above that there were two broad cases to consider. In the elastic case, the unskilled wage is
always depressed by progress of whatever kind in the X sector. Accordingly global technical
progress in X would require a rise in European unemployment to meet the wage target. Progress
in Y, by contrast, would reduce unemployment. In the inelastic case, the induced price changes
may reverse the impact sectoral effects on factor prices. In this case, at unchanged employment,
the unskilled wage will fall with all labor saving technical change (in X or Y), and with neutral
technical change in the Ysector. Accordingly, a rise in European unemployment will be required
to again attain the target wage. By contrast, all skill saving technical change, and neutral technical
change in the X sector will reduce European unemployment. In the full equilibrium, price changes
will always filly offset the impact effect on factor prices. Thus technical change in X of whatever
factor bias will in fi.111 equilibrium always lead to a fall in the price of X [See Figure 5]. As well,
technical progress in Yalways leads in full equilibrium to a rise in the price of X which returns the
13A complete set of results is detailed in Appendix B.
14unskilled wage to its initial level. Accordingly, none of the global shocks satis& the Lawrence-
Slaughter criterion that relative goods prices should be unaffected. Nonetheless, all forms of
global progress in the Y sector satisfi the alternative Krueger-Sachs-Shatz criterion that the










Figure 5 Global Neutral Technical
Progress in X
Because incipient rises or declines in the unskilled wage are met with accommodating
changes in unemployment, the level of the unskilled wage is not affected by global technical
progress. The fill equilibrium effect on relative factor prices depends exclusively on the sector of
technical progress. If progress is in the X sector, then the relative wage will be unchanged; if in
the Ysector, then the re!ative wage of the skilled will rise. This is precisely opposite to the
conclusion that one would have in a model with fixed prices and no unemployment [see Learner
(1995)].
15We may also identifi cases of global technical progress in which the European
unemployment rate rises and the relative wage of the skilled rises. This combination occurs only in
the cases of neutral or labor saving technical change in the Ysector in the inelastic case. Recall
also that since our general system is consistent with factor price equalization, that the global
technical progress will not help us to understand divergent patterns of wage evolution between
Europe and America.]4
Consider now the case of technical progress which is localized in Europe. The basic
analysis outlined above continues to hold for Europe, with one amendment. There will be a
smaller supply shock for a fixed magnitude of technical change, hence the likelihood of price
changes reversing the impact effect on factor prices is diminished. This will tend to emphasize the
sectoral nature of technical change relative to its factor bias. Now consider the impact of local
European technical change on America. Since America does not experience any technical change,
the fill impact on its relative factor prices is determined ala Stolper-Samuelson by the
equilibrium changes in goods prices. Thus the relative skilled wage in America will rise as the
equilibrium relative price of X rises. A curious consequence is that local European technical
change gives rise to a magnified relative wage response in America relative to that in Europe.
From above, the European relative skilled wage rises with local tecfilcal progress in the Ysector,
and is unaffected by progress in the X sector. The effect of local European technical progress on
America is yet more dramatic. When this progress is in the Ysector, the American relative skilled
wage rises faster than in Europe, and when in the X sector actually declines. If we restrict
14Of course, a sharp result such as this depends on the fill set of assumptions that underlie
the conventional factor price equalization theorem. Departures from these assumptions,
accordingly, may modifi this conclusion.
16attention to cases in which European unemployment rises, the relative skilled wage in America
rises, and in which this rise occurs more strongly than in Europe, then we have the cases of
European local technical progress that is either neutral or labor saving in the Ysector. As in the
case of global technical progress, none of the cases of progress in Europe satis~ the Lawrence-
Slaughter criterion that relative goods prices remain fixed, Ml cases of European progress in Y




























Figure 6 European Neutral Technical
Progress in Y
Finally, consider the case of local technical
since Europe is not experiencing technical change,
change in America. A first observation is that
its commitment to the minimum wage will
mean that in full equilibrium the goods price cannot change. Any induced excess supplies or
demands at this price in America will be filly accommodated via changes in employment in
Europe, Hence unemployment in Europe will rise as a result of all local American labor saving
17technical change as well as neutral technical change in the Ysector, It will fall in the remaining
cases. In all cases, European absolute and relative wages are unchanged. By contrast, in Arneric~
since goods prices are constant in equilibrium the changes in relative wages depend only on the
sector in which technical change occurs, not its factor bias. Thus Learner’s suggestion that it is
only the sector bias of technical change that matters is true for local American technical progress
even when America is large in the world, so long as Europe is committed to its minimum wage.
The relative skilled wage in America rises with tecfilcal progress of any variety in the X sector,
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Figure 7 American Labor Saving Technical
Progress in X
The final case is what we may call the Lawrence-Slaughter-Learner case [see Figure 7].
This is the case of local American labor saving technical progress in the skill intensive X sector.
This leads to a rise in the American relative skilled wage, no change in the European relative
skilled wage, a rise in European unemployment. The relative goods price is unchanged.
183,3 The Role of Factor Substitution
To this point we have made the strategic assumption that technologies are Leontief. This
greatly simplifies the analysis. However it can affect the qualitative results, so here we consider
the cases where factor substitution matters. One manifestation of the simplicity of the Leontief
framework is that it yields unambiguous predictions of the effects of tectilcal progress on the
terms of trade. When we allow for factor substitution we will need to reexamine this problem. We
first return to’our fill employment specification, and then consider it within our America/Europe
model with a fixed minimum wage and unemployment.
Where possible, we substitute away from the factor whose relative price has risen. This
substitution tends to relieve the scarcity of that factor, At fixed goods prices, this implies that
relative to the zero-substitution case, output will’shift toward the good that uses this factor
intensively. In some cases this only reinforces the effects described earlier, so has qualitatively the
same effect as the Leontief case. This is true for all neutral technical progress, and for factor-
saving progress in the sector that uses that factor intensively. However, this leaves two cases in
which the output effects resulting from factor substitution oppose and may reverse those we have
detailed earlier. This occurs in the cases of labor saving technical progress in the skill intensive
sector, and skill-saving technical progress in the labor intensive sector.
Consider the case of labor saving technical progress in the skill intensive sector. At
unchanged goods prices, the technical change raises the relative skilled wage. If technologies were
Leontie~ at fixed prices the labor saving progress would lead to a rise in the relative supply of Y.
Here, though, the substitution away from higher-priced skill leads both sectors to economize on
the use of skill, This substitution biases production toward X, and given sufficiently elastic factor
19substitution could lead to a rise in the relative supply of X, Thus the relative price of X in
equilibrium would rise if factor substitution possibilities are poor, but fall if these possibilities are
excellent. In the former case, the terms of trade movement reinforces the impact effect on factor
prices. In the latter case, it opposes and potentially could reverse these effects. Thus labor saving
technical progress in the skill intensive sector will tend to raise the relative skilled wage when
factor substitution is poor. However, if factor substitution is excellent, it could depress the
relative wage of the skilled. This is made more likely when substitution in demand across goods is
poor, A parallel ambiguity could be derived for skill saving technical progress in the labor
intensive sector. If factor substitution possibilities are poor, then the relative price of X will fall
and the relative skilled wage will fall for sure. In the substitution possibilities are excellent, the
relative price of X will rise, and this will counteract and perhaps reverse the impact effect which
lowered the relative skilled wage.
It remains to consider the implications of these results in our fill model with
unemployment. We will continue to relate these changes to the stylized facts developed above.
Consider first the case of labor saving technical progress in the skill intensive sector. Whether this
progress is global, or localized in Europe or America, the new possibility opened up is that at the
initial level of unemployment this could cause the European unskilled wage to rise. Thus, in
equilibrium this could be associated with afall in European unemployment. While this is an
interesting observation, and not obvious, it also conflicts with the stylized fact that European
unemployment has risen. Accordingly, we will rule these out as cases of interest.
Now consider the case of skill saving technical progress in the labor intensive sector.
Whether this progress is global, or localized in Europe or America, the new possibility opened up
20is that at the initial level of unemployment this could cause the European unskilled wage to fall.
Thus, in equilibrium this could be associated with a rise in European unemployment. This is in
accord with the stylized facts. The equilibrium changes in relative wages, though, are exactly the
same as previously for the various cases. When the progress is global, the relative skilled wage
rises as sharply in Europe as America, violating one of our stylized facts. When this progress is
localized in A.meric~ the relative skilled wage there actually declines, again violating one of our
stylized facts. Finally, when the progress is localized in Europe, the relative skilled wage rises in
Europe, but it rises yet more sharply in America. The one stylized fact that is violated by this case
is that here skill intensity falls in both sectors. Accordingly, we can conclude that none of the
cases that rely on factor substitution to establish qualitative results are consistent with the stylized
facts we set out at the start.
4 Conclusion
The most important contribution of this paper is that it provides a unified framework for
examining the role of technical change in the salient factor market developments in recent decades
in the United States and Europe. It demonstrates that the mediation of local institutions maybe
crucial in understanding the qualitative effects of technical change on relative wages and
employment for the world as a whole, These depart in important but sensible ways from what we
would anticipate in a world of universally flexible wages. It also identifies the few specific patterns
of technical change that satisfi a set of key stylized facts. Accordingly, it aims to sharpen the
focus of the discussion relating technical change to movements in relative wages and employment.
21These points are developed in a stylized model of trade between a flexible wage America
and a rigid real wage Europe. In spite of the simplicity of the fi-amework, a number of strong
results emerge: 15
First, global technical progress never raises the relative wage of the unskilled, Moreover,
for the economy in which the minimum wage is imposed, no technological progress -- local or
global -- can raise the relative wage of the unskilled. This is not to say that the unskilled
necessarily lose from technical progress. While they do not gain in relative wage terms, their real
wage may be raised by technical progress. More importantly, the locus, sector, and factor bias of
this change will be important in determining the impact on unemployment,
Second, global technical progress here will not help to account for divergent wage trends,
even when accompanied by strongly differentiated factor market institutions. The reason, of
course, is the factor price equalization result noted earlier.
Third, the qualitative change in relative wages does depend on whether the technical
progress is global or local, and if the latter, in which country it is localized. However it does not
depend on the factor bias of the technical change. This,
us to the simple small economy case of Learner (1995).
however, does not suggest that it returns
One reason is that the direction of the
change in relative wages may appear perverse relative to that case, For example, we will see that
when technical progress is localized in Europe, all forms of progress in the labor intensive good
raise the relative wage of the skilled in both countries. While this particular result depends
importantly on the good in which the minimum wage is specified, it does caution against assuming
15The results are stated here for the set of comparative statics examined. They assume that
technologies are initially identical, that the minimum wage in Europe binds throughout, that
relative factor intensities are unchanged, and that diversification of production is maintained.
22that the flexible wage results will be robust to the introduction of alternative specifications of the
factor market institutions.
Fourth, the Leamer-Krugman discussion of the relevance of sector versus factor bias of
technical change here maps precisely into a debate over the impact on unemployment. Thus both
the sector and factor bias of tectilcal change play important roles in accounting for movements in
relative wages and unemployment.
Fifih, when technical progress is local, in either country, the American relative wage
responds with systematically higher variance, regardless of the sector or factor bias of the change.
The European commitment to the minimum wage shields it from the variable wage effects, but the
pressures are absorbed through changes in employment.
Finally, the possibility of distinguishing technical change by sector, by factor bias, by local
versus global, and by the strength of induced price effects, suggests an unmanageable number of
cases to contemplate. However, if we use the few stylized facts sketched above, the theory
identifies only a few candidates that can explain these facts. Two are what may be thought of as
“Krugman” cases -- where induced price changes become a central part of the story. These
include global neutral and labor saving technical progress concentrated in the unskilled intensive
sector. This raises the relative skilled wage in both America and Europe,
European unemployment. It accords with the Krueger-Sachs-Shatz view
while also raising
that the relative wage of
the unskilled intensive good has fallen, rather than with the Lawrence-Slaughter view that it is
unchanged. Its one drawback is that it does not help to account for the stronger rise of relative
skilled wages in America. The second case is local European neutral and labor saving technical
progress concentrated in the unskilled intensive sector. This is similar to the previous case, except
23that American relative skilled wages do rise more sharply than in Europe. The final case of
particular interest is what maybe termed the Lawrence-Slaughter-Learner case, that of local
American labor saving technical progress concentrated in the skill intensive sector. This raises the
relative skilled wage in America, and leaves it unchanged in Europe. It accords with the view of
Lawrence-Slaughter, rather than that of Krueger-Sachs-Shatz, in that relative goods prices do not
change.
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